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How	will	the	latest	judicial	reform	controversy	affect
Poland’s	presidential	election?
New	disciplinary	procedures	for	Polish	judges	have	moved	a	controversial	judicial	reform	programme
to	the	top	of	the	political	agenda	in	the	run-up	to	Poland’s	presidential	election	in	May.	Aleks
Szczerbiak	writes	that	although	the	issue	could	mobilise	and	consolidate	the	right-wing	vote,	thereby
helping	incumbent	President	Andrzej	Duda,	the	potential	for	political	instability	and	legal	chaos	means
it	could	also	damage	his	re-election	prospects.
A	radical	but	fiercely	contested	overhaul	of	the	judicial	system	has	been	one	of	the	main	sources	of	political
controversy	in	Poland	since	it	was	introduced	two-and-a-half	years	ago	by	the	right-wing	Law	and	Justice	(PiS)
party,	the	country’s	ruling	grouping	since	autumn	2015.	One	of	the	most	important	and	contentious	elements	of	the
reform	programme	was	the	establishment	of	a	new	supreme	court	chamber	to	conduct	disciplinary	actions	against
judges.	The	new	chamber	was	appointed	by	an	overhauled	national	judicial	council	(KRS),	the	body	that	nominates
judges	and	decides	how	the	courts	are	run,	in	which	the	majority	of	members	were	selected	mainly	by	parliament,
rather	than	the	legal	profession,	as	had	previously	been	the	case.
The	government’s	supporters	argued	that	the	reforms	were	sorely	needed	because	Polish	courts	were	too	slow,
deeply	inefficient	and	tolerated	frequent	irregularities	and	corrupt	practices.	Overhauling	the	courts	is	one	of	the
most	important	elements	of	Law	and	Justice’s	programme	because	the	party	believes	that,	following	the	country’s
flawed	transition	to	democracy	in	1989,	the	judiciary,	like	many	key	Polish	institutions,	was	expropriated	by	an
extremely	well-entrenched,	and	often	deeply	corrupt,	post-communist	elite,	which	then	co-opted	a	new	legal
establishment	that	perpetuated	its	legacy.	The	judicial	elite,	they	said,	viewed	itself	as	a	superior	grouping	out	of
touch	with	ordinary	citizens,	and	operated	as	a	‘state	within	a	state’	that	was	incapable	of	reforming	itself.	In	these
circumstances,	they	argued,	making	judges	and	their	supervisory	organs	more	accountable	to	elected	bodies	was
both	justifiable	and	in	line	with	practices	in	other	established	democracies.
The	liberal-centrist	and	left-wing	opposition,	and	Poland’s	legal	establishment,	on	the	other	hand,	strongly	criticised
the	reforms	as	an	attack	on	the	rule	of	law	and	infringement	of	the	key	democratic	principle	of	constitutional
separation	of	powers.	Warning	of	a	drift	towards	authoritarian	rule,	the	government’s	opponents	argued	that,	by
putting	judicial	appointments	under	political	control,	these	reforms	allowed	Law	and	Justice	to	pack	the	courts	with
its	own,	hand-picked	nominees,	and	thereby	undermined	their	independence.	Following	mass	protests	in	the
summer	of	2017,	Law	and	Justice-backed	President	Andrzej	Duda	vetoed	some	of	the	reforms,	but	his	revised
version	finally	approved	by	parliament	was	actually	very	close	to	the	government’s	original	proposals;	the	main
change	being	a	guarantee	that	parliamentary	nominees	to	the	national	judicial	council	would	be	elected	by	a
qualified	three-fifths	supermajority,	forcing	the	ruling	party	to	negotiate	appointments	with	opposition	deputies.
Clashing	with	the	EU	political	establishment
The	reforms	also	triggered	a	series	of	clashes	between	Poland	and	the	EU	political	establishment.	During	the	last
four	years,	the	government	has	been	in	an	ongoing	dispute	with	the	European	Commission	over	so-called	‘rule	of
law’	issues.	Initially,	this	was	over	the	membership	and	functioning	of	the	country’s	constitutional	tribunal,	but	the
stand-off	escalated	in	2017	to	include	Law	and	Justice’s	judicial	reforms.	The	Commission	took	the	unprecedented
step	of	initiating	an	action	against	Poland	under	Article	7	of	the	European	treaties,	which	can	be	invoked	against
any	EU	member	state	when	it	is	felt	there	is	a	‘systemic	threat’	to	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law,	threatening
Warsaw	with	sanctions	including	the	suspension	of	its	European	Council	voting	rights.	However,	the	Commission
was	unable	to	secure	the	qualified	majority	required	among	EU	member	states	to	move	beyond	the	initial	stage	of
the	procedure.
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: How will the latest judicial reform controversy affect Poland’s presidential election? Page 1 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-01-27
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/01/27/how-will-the-latest-judicial-reform-controversy-affect-polands-presidential-election/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
Consequently,	at	the	same	time	the	Commission	initiated	infringement	procedures	against	Poland	in	the	EU	Court
of	Justice,	while	Polish	judges	also	submitted	a	number	of	‘prejudicial	questions’	regarding	various	aspects	of	the
reforms.	Last	November,	the	Court	made	a	ruling	in	one	such	case	brought	by	Polish	supreme	court	judges	who
questioned	the	independence	of	the	new	disciplinary	chamber	to	handle	appeals	against	early	retirement	on	the
grounds	that	it	was	appointed	by	the	new	national	judicial	council.	Although	the	Court	stopped	short	of	declaring	the
new	chamber	illegal,	it	referred	the	case	back	to	the	Polish	supreme	court	to	determine	whether	the	former	was
sufficiently	independent	from	political	influence.	In	doing	so,	it	set	out	criteria	to	determine	whether	judicial
appointments	met	EU	standards,	paying	particular	attention	to	how	a	body	was	appointed.
Law	and	Justice	welcomed	the	fact	that	the	EU	Court	left	it	up	to	Polish	judicial	bodies	to	decide	on	the
independence	of	the	disciplinary	chamber.	However,	the	government’s	opponents	felt	the	Court	provided	them	with
a	tool	for	challenging	and	dismantling	the	reforms.	Some	Polish	judges	interpreted	the	ruling	as	a	judgment	that	the
new	national	judicial	council	was	not	a	legitimate	body,	and	questioned	the	verdicts	of	judges	appointed	by	it.
Moreover,	last	December	the	supreme	court	itself	ruled	that,	in	its	current	composition,	the	council	was	neither
impartial	nor	politically	independent,	so	the	judges	appointed	by	it	and	their	verdicts,	including	the	new	disciplinary
chamber,	were	not	legal	according	to	EU	law.
Intimidating	judges	or	preventing	legal	chaos?
In	response,	Law	and	Justice	introduced	sweeping	new	disciplinary	procedures	–	with	penalties	including	fines,
movement	to	another	court,	and	removal	from	office	–	against	judges	who:	prevented	or	significantly	impeded	the
functioning	of	the	justice	system;	refused	to	recognise	the	legitimacy	of	other	judges;	or	participated	in	public
activities	that	undermined	the	functioning	of	the	state’s	governing	organs,	or	were	incompatible	with	the	principles
of	judicial	independence	and	impartiality.
The	government’s	opponents	argued	that	the	new	measures,	which	they	dubbed	a	‘gagging	law’	(ustawa
kagańcowa),	further	undermined	judicial	independence	by	attempting	to	intimidate	critical	judges	so	that	they	ruled
in	line	with	the	ruling	party’s	expectations.	They	also	warned	that	the	law	could	lead	to	Poland	being	excluded	from
the	EU,	so-called	‘Polexit’,	as	its	provisions	violated	the	terms	of	the	European	treaties	by	undermining	the	primacy
of	Union	law.	For	its	part,	the	Commission	called	upon	the	Polish	authorities	to	suspend	passage	of	the	law	until	it
could	be	scrutinised	by	the	Venice	Commission,	an	advisory	body	on	constitutional	matters	to	the	Council	of	Europe
human	rights	watchdog.	Earlier	this	month,	the	opposition-controlled	Senate,	Poland’s	less	powerful	second
chamber,	invited	the	Venice	Commission	to	review	the	legislation.
However,	Law	and	Justice	dismissed	the	Venice	Commission’s	negative	evaluation,	arguing	that	the	watchdog	was
not	impartial	and	was	too	closely	aligned	with	the	Polish	legal	establishment.	Accusing	the	legal	establishment	and
opposition	of	wanting	Poland	to	be	a	‘judge-ocracy’	(sędziokracja),	the	government’s	supporters	said	that	the	new
regulations	were	necessary	for	society	to	feel	that	the	judiciary	was	impartial	and	apolitical,	and	an	essential
response	to	those	judges	who,	by	questioning	their	colleagues’	legitimacy,	threatened	to	engulf	the	Polish	legal
system	in	chaos.
To	date,	nearly	500	judges	have	been	nominated	by	the	new	national	judicial	council	and	all	their	rulings	could	be
challenged.	Law	and	Justice	argued	that	the	new	regulations	were	based	on	similar	provisions	in	other	countries,
notably	France	and	Germany;	although	the	government’s	critics	said	that	the	party	was	distorting	how	these	laws
worked	in	practice.
Alienating	moderate	voters	or	consolidating	the	base?
In	some	ways,	the	revival	of	the	judicial	reform	controversy	is	highly	problematic	for	Law	and	Justice,	with	a	crucial
presidential	election	due	in	May.	The	party	lacks	the	three-fifths	parliamentary	majority	required	to	over-turn	a
presidential	veto,	so	Duda’s	defeat	would	seriously	hamper	its	ability	to	govern	effectively.	Given	his	high	popularity
ratings,	Duda	remains	the	clear	favourite,	but	last	October’s	parliamentary	election	showed	how	polarised	and
evenly	balanced	support	between	the	government	and	opposition	camps	is,	and	the	presidential	poll	will	be	much
closer	if	it	turns	into	another	plebiscite	on	the	Law	and	Justice	government.
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Andrzej	Duda,	Credit:	Chairman	of	the	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff	/	Dominique	A.	Pineiro	(CC	BY	2.0)
Moreover,	in	order	to	win,	a	successful	candidate	has	to	craft	a	unifying	and	consensual	appeal	that	can	secure
more	than	50%	of	the	votes,	so	Law	and	Justice	should	be	avoiding	divisive	and	polarising	issues	that	could
alienate	more	moderate	centrist	voters.	A	sense	that	the	ruling	party	is	associated	with	political	instability	and	social
conflict	could,	therefore,	rebound	on	Duda.	There	are	also	concerns	that,	by	re-igniting	Law	and	Justice’s	conflict
with	the	EU	political	establishment,	the	issue	could	allow	the	opposition	to	revive	its	‘Polexit’	narrative	which,	given
Poles’	overwhelming	support	for	membership	of	the	Union,	is	a	toxic	slogan	for	any	mainstream	Polish	politician	to
be	associated	with.
Nonetheless,	Law	and	Justice	seems	determined	to	push	through	the	new	disciplinary	regulations	because	it
believes	the	risk	of	legal	chaos	if	judges	start	questioning	the	status	of	their	colleagues’	rulings	is	even	greater.	For
his	part,	Duda	has	taken	a	clear	stance	in	support	of	the	government	on	this	issue.	Law	and	Justice	was	also
hoping	that	the	European	Commission	under	its	new	President	Ursula	von	der	Leyen	would	be	more
accommodating	towards	Poland	and	put	‘rule	of	law’	issues	on	the	back-burner	in	order	to	improve	strategic	co-
operation	with	Warsaw,	particularly	as	the	party	played	a	key	role	in	her	appointment.	However,	in	a	major	setback,
earlier	this	month	the	Commission	decided	to	ask	the	EU	Court	to	impose	emergency	interim	measures	suspending
the	functioning	of	the	disciplinary	chamber.
In	fact,	for	the	moment	at	least,	Law	and	Justice	appears	to	have	sustained	only	minimal	political	damage,	as	the
issue	has	not	yet	developed	the	momentum	that	it	had	a	couple	of	years	ago.	Although	there	have	been	anti-
government	protests,	the	scale	of	these	is	not	comparable	to	the	summer	2017	groundswell	which	helped	persuade
Duda	to	veto	and	amend	some	of	the	original	proposals.	Even	if	Poles	have	misgiving	about	whether	the
government’s	specific	reforms	will	significantly	improve	the	functioning	of	the	judicial	system,	Law	and	Justice	has
been	effective	at	convincing	many	of	them	that,	for	all	its	faults,	it	is	at	least	trying	to	tackle	a	problem	which
previous	administrations	appeared	content	to	ignore.
Moreover,	opinion	polls	suggest	that	there	is	actually	considerable	uncertainty	about	the	government’s	latest
proposals.	For	example,	a	December	survey	carried	out	for	the	‘Rzeczpospolita’	newspaper	by	the	IBRiS	agency
found	that,	while	Poles	opposed	a	ban	on	judges	questioning	the	appointment	or	legality	of	their	colleagues	by	40%
to	36%,	27%	responded	that	they	did	not	know.	A	Kantar	survey	for	‘TVN/TVN24’	also	found	that,	by	a	53%	to	40%
margin,	Poles	disagreed	that	Law	and	Justice’s	policies	could	lead	to	‘Polexit’.	Indeed,	some	commentators	argue
that	Law	and	Justice	is	using	judicial	reform	as	a	so-called	‘wedge	issue’	to	boost	turnout	among	its	core	electorate
in	the	presidential	election,	as	well	as	trying	to	secure	the	support	of	the	one	million	Poles	who	voted	for	the	radical
right	Eurosceptic	‘Confederation’	(Konfederacja)	grouping	in	last	October’s	poll.
Who	gets	the	blame?
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For	the	moment,	therefore,	the	latest	judicial	reform	controversy	appears	to	be	having	relatively	few	damaging
effects	on	Law	and	Justice	and	may	even	help	to	mobilise	and	consolidate	the	core	right-wing	vote.	However,	if	it
contributes	to	a	sense	of	endless	political	instability	and	societal	conflict	this	could	harm	Duda’s	re-election
prospects.
The	key	risk	here	is	that	the	new	disciplinary	regulations	actually	radicalise	rather	than	pacify	the	government’s
opponents	in	the	judiciary,	and	lead	to	precisely	the	mass	rejection	of	rulings	by	‘new’	judges	that	the	legislation
was	designed	to	avoid,	particularly	if	the	EU	Court	throws	the	government’s	opponents	a	lifeline	by	calling	for	the
suspension	of	the	disciplinary	chamber.	The	issue	then	becomes	how	quickly	such	legal	chaos	starts	to	affect
ordinary	citizens	on	a	large	scale,	and	who	gets	the	blame	for	this:	the	government	and	Duda	or	the	opposition	and
the	legal	establishment?
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	at	Aleks	Szczerbiak’s	personal	blog.	The	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,
not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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